4 April: Invited lecture
Speakers: Albert J. J. Anglberger and Johannes Korbmacher (Bayreuth, MCMP)
Time&Place: 16.45-18.30, Room DZ010
Title: An Exact Truthmaker Semantics for Explicit Permission and Obligation (joint work with F. Faroldi)
Abstract: We develop an exact truthmaker semantics for explicit permission and obligation. The idea is that with every singular act, we associate a sphere of permissions and a sphere of requirements: the acts that are rendered permissible and the acts that are rendered required by the act. We propose the following clauses for explicit permissions and obligations:
9 May: Invited lecture
Speaker: Shahira Sharaf (Tilburg University)
Time&Place: 16.45-18.30, Room DZ004
Title: What is Fuzzy Logic? And why do we need it?
Abstract: In this talk, I am going to focus on two points:
The first one is approaching fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic, by explaining what the fuzziness means in real world, and what is the definition of fuzzy sets compared with classical or two-valued sets and with multi-valued sets. Then, I am going to talk about the structure of fuzzy logic; i.e. the membership functions of fuzzy sets, linguistic variables and linguistic modifiers. This will be followed by the basic operations on fuzzy sets compared with the ones in two-valued sets.
The second point is about our need to fuzzy logic. I am going to talk about the differences between fuzzy logic and probability theory. Then I am going to talk about fuzzy If-Then rules which are the main tools of applying fuzzy logic as a method to study different phenomena in scientific fields.
23 May: Invited lecture
Speaker: Matteo Pascucci (Università di Verona)
Time&Place: 16.45-18.30, Room DZ008
Title: An alternative reduction of deontic logic to standard modal logic
Abstract: This presentation concerns the formal relation between modal notions belonging to different families. Following a tradition of study that originated with some works by A.R. Anderson, T. Smiley and S. Kanger, I will analyse an alternative solution to define the deontic operators of obligation (O) and permission (P) within a language of standard modal logic enriched with a propositional constant denoting a set of norms. I will show that the deontic fragments of normal modal systems resulting from the novel definitions of O and P are weaker than the usual ones and, in particular, do not include among their theorems some formulas representing well-known deontic paradoxes.